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GEND ER  E QUA L I TY ,  FA M I LY  LAW  AND 
A CCE SS  TO J U STI CE 
MARY JA N E M OSSMA N* 
 
A BSTR A CT 
 
This article focuses on recent issues in Canada concerning (in)equality of access 
to justice in family law matters on the basis of gender. Citing a recent report 
of the Canadian Bar Association's Task Force on Gender Equality which 
identified problems, especially in legal aid funding, for family law clients, the 
paper suggests that the Task Force's conclusions about gender inequality in 
legally- aided family law matters are closely related to other issues about 
gender and legal aid: the ongoing controversy about the appropriateness of 
student legal aid clinics which have adopted policies of representation for 
battered women, but not for alleged batterers; and a current issue in Ontario 
about the need for a 'woman only' family law clinic service. The article 
suggests that these issues need to be examined in light of basic principles 
about legal aid funding: the reality of 'neutrality' in gender-neutral categories 
of entitlement; the 'public/ private' dichotomy created by well-funded legal 
aid services for criminal law matters ('public') and inadequate funding for 
family law matters ('private'); and the impact of constitutional guarantees of 
equality in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As well, the paper 
suggests a need for 'revisioning' access to justice which promotes gender 
equality. While the paper focuses on recent issues in Canada, it illustrates 
approaches to problems of gender and access to justice which are 
 international, particularly in the context of down- turns in national and 
international economies. 
 
1.  I N TR O D U CTI O N 
The low status of family law pervades all facets of our justice system and is 
reflected in a lack of public resources devoted to resolving conflicts in this 
critical area. This low status is rooted in the gender-related approach of our 
legal system . . . Flowing from the gender bias in our justice system is the 
devaluation of family matters as being essentially private and therefore outside 
the realm of the 'real law'.1 
These assertions about gender inequality in family law matters were 
made in a 1993 report sponsored by the Canadian Bar Association. The 
main focus of the CBA report was an assessment of gender equality in 
the legal profession in Canada, with recommendations for 'fundamental 
change'.2 The report reviewed the problem of gender inequality in the 
legal profession in a variety of contexts: law schools and bar admission 
programmes; private practice firms, government legal departments and 
corporate settings; courts and tribunals; and law societies and the 
Canadian Bar Association itself.3 Having identified the nature and 
scale of the problems of gender inequality, the report set out a 
framework for understanding equality and discrimination in Canadian 
law4 and the factors which should motivate the legal profession to 
change. According to the report, change is mandated because: 
 - gender equality is a fundamental legal norm; 
- gender equality is a matter of ethics and justice; 
- gender equality in the legal profession represents enlightened self- 
interest and accountability within a self-regulating profession; and 
- gender equality for lawyers is in the public interest.5 
Significantly, in the context of this report devoted to gender equality 
in the legal profession, the Task Force devoted a full chapter to assessing 
the practice of family law in Canada as 'a case study'.6 Commenting 
on the number of submissions received from judges, law teachers and 
practitioners (both in private practice firms and in government) 
expressing concerns about the practice of family law, the Task Force 
report explained that its review of family law also permitted an 
assessment of the degree to which the justice system 'reflected the 
priorities and values of Canadian society'. Thus, the report noted the oft 
expressed commitments of federal and provincial governments in 
Canada sup- porting family life, legislative enactments designed to 
protect family members, and legal aid schemes created to ensure 
access to justice in family matters. For the Task Force, the case study 
of family law was an opportunity to ask searching questions about 
the reality of these commitments: 
Are these endeavours backed up by practical commitments? Are the lofty 
phrases of our legislators reflected in the concrete experiences of our family 
lawyers and litigants? In reviewing the evidence about the practice of family 
 law in Canada, the Task Force found that the reality fell far short of our 
aspirations and our ideals. Lawyers struggling to provide justice to litigants in 
this area received little support despite verbal assurances from many levels of 
government. In the cynical words of one female lawyer, governments provide 
'all possible aid short of actual help'.7 
Thus, according to the Task Force report, the family law context and 
the situation of female lawyers in this area of practice represented 'a 
good case study of the impact of gender inequality on the justice 
system'.8 
The report's case study on family law identified a number of features 
which contribute to the disparity between law's stated commitments to 
family matters and the reality of family law in practice. Central to the 
problem, according to the report, is the lack of resources available in 
family law matters. This scarcity of resources is evident in the shortage 
of vital financial and judicial resources in the justice system for family 
law dispute resolution, as well as in the absence of sufficient legal aid 
resources for family law clients. As well, the relatively low status 
accorded to the practice of family law limits the career options of family 
lawyers, a disproportionate number of whom are women lawyers in 
Canada. 
In this way, the report suggests that the gender inequality of women 
in the legal profession intersects with the gender inequity of the justice 
system in family law; although women who practise as family lawyers 
may be relatively better-paid than their female clients, their 
 circumstances are, relative to men who are lawyers, frequently 
unsatisfactory. 9 As the report explained, 'it is very difficult [for lawyers 
practising family law] to be in a position where partners feel you are 
billing far too little, and clients feel you are billing far too much', 10 
and where 'negative comments and outright contempt' make law 
practice unpleasant. Since a disproportionately high number of 
Canadian family lawyers are women, gender inequality in family law 
matters contributes directly to gender inequality within the legal 
profession. 
The CBA report's 'case study' on family law thus raises important 
equality issues for both family law practitioners and the legal profession 
as a whole. For those involved in family law practice, the report rein- 
forces Michael Freeman's assertion that 'lawyers who remain 
technicians cannot contribute to the . . . debate currently raging about 
the family'.11 For the legal profession more generally, the issues also 
raise profound questions about the administration of justice, questions 
which are increasingly being raised in Canada in the context of 
challenges about legal aid funding in family law matters. As needs 
for legal aid funding have intensified on one hand, and governmental 
resources have declined in the current economic circumstances in 
Canada on the other,12 challenges about the allocation of scarce legal 
aid resources (especially for women claimants involved in family law 
disputes) have become more frequent and more bitterly debated 
 among lawyers. In this context, the CBA report's case study on family 
law presents a challenge to the legal profession as a whole. 
This paper reviews the report's consideration of legal aid funding 
in family law and its recommendations, having regard to some recent 
challenges in Ontario concerning gendered legal aid services in the 
family law context. It addresses these issues about gender equality in 
legal aid services by rethinking some of the fundamental assumptions 
of legal aid services in Canada, and the ways in which such assumptions 
may reinforce, rather than eliminate, gender inequality for legal aid 
claimants. While the focus of the analysis is family law and legal aid 
services in the Canadian context, the issues are similar for a number of 
other jurisdictions where recent governmental policies (as in the United 
Kingdom) may exacerbate the problem of gender and unequal access 
to justice in relation to family law.13 
 
2 . G E N D E R  E QUA LITY  C H A L LE N G ES  T O  L E G A L  A ID  SER V I C ES 
IN  FA M I LY  LAW 
The CBA report characterized inadequate resources in relation to legal 
aid services as 'systemic injustice' for family law clients (and their 
lawyers). According to the report, the Task Force received an 'outpour- 
ing of frustration' in submissions about the funding of family legal aid 
in general and the 'gross discrepancy between the greater resources 
allocated to criminal legal aid and the much smaller amount available 
 for family legal aid'.14 Concerns were expressed about tariff levels for 
family law cases, the absence of funding for special disbursements 
(including expert witnesses), 15 and the emphasis in family law tariffs on 
litigation and court appearances rather than research, mediation and 
negotiation, even if the latter were successful. 16 
Moreover, many lawyers asserted that 'they simply could not afford 
to take legal aid certificates' or that their firms would not permit them 
to do so. According to the report, the Task Force heard an 'oft-repeated 
remark' from family lawyers that it was cheaper for family lawyers to 
work pro bono than on legal aid funding, thus avoiding the paperwork 
required by legal aid programmes. More pointedly, family lawyers drew 
the Task Force's attention to the disparity in resources available to legal 
aid clients for criminal law matters, by contrast with those for family 
law clients: 
Why does criminal legal aid pay so very well financially while doing family legal 
aid is a positive drain on your bank account? In British Columbia one day in 
criminal court pays $1600.00 whereas one day in family court pays $400.00. 
This seems to be a form of systemic discrimination calculated to lure good 
family lawyers into lucrative criminal practice. Where are our 'family values'? 
There seems to be an ironic contrast between the verbal focus on family values 
and the tangible support given to criminal matters.17 
Responding to these concerns, the Task Force recommended that federal 
and provincial Governments 'ensure that adequate legal aid funding for 
 family law cases' be guaranteed across Canada and that the federal 
Government 'establish a national civil legal aid tariff' .18 
As the Task Force report noted, its review of family law represented 
'only a beginning'. Moreover, its recommendations need to be 
considered in light of evolving constitutional jurisprudence about 
equality in Canada,19 a context in which claims have been defined by 
the Supreme 
Court of Canada on the basis of not just 'formal' but also 'substantive' 
equality goals for those who are most disadvantaged in Canadian soci- 
ety .20 Thus, while the report's recommendations concerning greater 
levels of funding in family law cases are clearly desirable, a more probing 
analysis may be needed to accomplish these objectives effectively. This 
conclusion is reinforced, moreover, by taking account of recent disputes 
about legal aid services for women seeking assistance in the context of 
family violence. 
The best-known of these disputes involved the decision of a student 
legal aid clinic at the University of Ottawa to provide legal assistance 
to women who had experienced violence from family partners, and to 
deny service to alleged male batterers in cases of domestic violence. 
As Jennie Abell has argued, the controversy about this decision raised 
significant philosophical and political issues about equality in the legal 
process, although the form of the debate which resulted from the clinic's 
decision generally failed to address them, focusing instead on issues 
 about decision-making powers within the profession and on process and 
procedures. 21 Although some of the 'facts' of the dispute remain hotly 
contested, it seems clear that there was an agreement in principle that 
the clinic would not simply turn away male batterers seeking legal 
advice and representation; instead, the clinic seems to have intended to 
refer such applicants to the local legal aid programme for assistance, 
and it is at least arguable that they would have received representation 
from lawyers on the basis of legal aid certificates, or at the very least 
duty counsel services.22 
Whether or not the clinic's referral policy was ever fully delineated 
or effectively implemented, however, the local Bar (and especially 
members of the criminal defence Bar) immediately expressed outrage 
about the decision, calling for the suspension of governmental funding 
of the student legal aid clinic and then laying a formal complaint, 
based on sex discrimination, with Ontario's Law Society in 1990.23 
Eventually, a formal hearing was conducted and various efforts to 
achieve compromise through negotiation occurred, although the issue 
has continued to resurface in other contexts. 
Especially for the Law Society, these issues of gender and legal aid 
services remain controversial, and proposals to establish specialized 
legal aid services for women continue to meet criticisms based on sex 
discrimination. Thus, in the fall of 1993, the Law Society rejected a 
governmental proposal to establish a women-only family law clinic, once 
 again on the basis that it would be 'discriminatory'. According to press 
reports of the decision, the Law Society objected to the creation of such 
a clinic on the grounds that no case had been established showing that 
a clinic 'offering these broad services is driven by an access need peculiar 
to women'.24   Such comments  suggest  that the issue about women's 
access to legal aid services in family law, especially in cases of 
domestic violence, remains somewhat misunderstood as well as 
seriously con- 
tested at the present time.25 
According to Abell, the debate about the policy adopted by the 
Ottawa student legal aid clinic showed that those opposed to the 
decision failed to understand the Supreme Court's decision about 
equal- ity in 1989 in Andrews, and the need to take account of 
substantive inequality based on societal disadvantage, not just the 
'sameness' standard of formal equality:26 
Detractors of the policy charged that it was discriminatory, simply because 
the clinic proposed to treat men differently from women. Their argument 
ignores the contextualized legal meaning of equality elaborated in recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Thus, it is problematic even at the 
level of strict legal analysis. [According to Andrews], not every distinction 
between individuals and groups will give rise to a violation of section 15 of 
the Charter. Instead, it is clear that the promotion of equality contemplated by 
that section goes beyond the mere elimination of distinctions in treatment to a 
 consideration of situation and impact.27 
In light of the Supreme Court jurisprudence, it was thus possible to 
see the student clinic's policy as one which 'adverted to the special 
needs of women in dealing with the legal system, the serious social 
problem of violence against women, and the fact that many women 
have gone without representation in dealing with the legal 
consequences of violence'.28 Moreover, for the clinic's services to be 
effective in this role, the students saw their policy as necessary 'both to 
avoid potential conflicts 
of interest and to enhance their credibility in women's eyes'.29 
Thus,  these  continuing  challenges  to  the  development  of legal  aid 
services  expressly  designed  to meet  women' s needs  in family  matters 
raise  important  and  controversial  issues  about  the  meaning  of gender 
· equality in the Canadian legal aid system. Moreover, while the 
recommendations  of the  CBA  report  affirm  the  need  for  action  in  
relation to  more  comprehensive  legal  aid  services  in  family  law,  these  
recent controversies  about  legal  aid  services  for  women  clearly  
demonstrate that fundamental  issues  remain  contested  among members  
of the legal profession.  Since these  issues  also  continue  to  impede  
reform  efforts designed to respond more effectively to the needs of 
women  claimants for legal aid services in family law matters, a more 
fundamental  assessment of gender equality and access to justice  in the 
family law context is needed. 
  
3. G E N D E R  E QUA L ITY , FA MILY  L AW  A N D  A CCESS  T 
O J U STIC E:  FU N DA M E N TA L  P R I N C I P LES 
As Deborah Rhode has suggested in relation to issues of justice and 
gender in the United States, 'significant progress toward gender 
equality 
will require . . . substantial changes in our legal paradigms and social 
priorities' .30 Similarly, in thinking about the issue of legal aid services 
for women in family law cases in Canada, it is necessary to rethink some 
fundamental principles, both about legal aid services and about gender 
equality in the family law context. This paper explores some of these 
more fundamental principles by challenging the 'neutrality' of current 
categories of entitlement to legal aid services and by demonstrating how 
they replicate the public/private dichotomy so frequently used to deny 
legal equality to women. As well, the paper focuses on equality 
jurisprudence in Canada, especially in relation to gender issues, and 
raises questions about its potential for challenging current 
arrangements for legal aid services. In doing so, the paper also 
envisages the need to transform law and legal processes so as to 
achieve justice for women in the family law context, an objective 
characterized by Rhode as one of 'broadening our aspirations to 
justice'. 31 
A. Neutrality 
 Legal aid services are provided in Canada (as elsewhere) on the basis 
of 'categorical entitlement'; that is, defined categories of legal services 
are offered, either on a mandatory or discretionary basis, to those who 
meet the programme's eligibility guidelines.32 On its face, a 'categorical 
entitlement' programme is gender neutral and non-discriminatory, 
merely defining the categories of legal services to which eligible claim- 
ants are entitled. For those involved in assessing the law's responsiveness 
to women's claims, however, such gender neutral categories may be 
inherently suspect as 'artificial classifications', because women were not 
involved in defining them, because women's interests may have been 
less valued or understood in the process of defining categories, or 
because legal aid programmes have replicated categories from the legal 
system which have not taken women's experiences into account.33  For 
these reasons, a categorical scheme of entitlement to legal aid services 
may mean that, in practice, women's needs are less well served than 
those of men. 
There is some data that the use of these 'neutral' categories for 
entitlement to legal aid services in Canada has resulted in a 
disproportionate amount of legal aid services for male rather than 
female claimants. Thus, for example, a 1992 report in Ontario 
concluded that 'the legal aid budget [in Ontario] is unequally 
distributed and favours men's legal problems, primarily criminal, over 
women's legal problems, primarily matrimonial' .34 This evidence that 
 men are more often entitled to legal aid services, by contrast with 
women, raises important questions about the substantive 'neutrality' of 
legal aid guidelines in practice,35 suggesting that gender-neutral 
language may, in fact, 'mask' hidden and gendered preferences for 
those legal aid services more frequently required by men. Moreover, 
especially in a context of diminishing state 
resources for legal aid services, statutory distinctions between services 
which are 'mandatory' and those which are regarded as 'discretionary' 
(distinctions which may also be phrased in gender neutral language) 
may result in practice in disproportionate resources for men who are 
legal aid claimants. 
In this context, moreover, the significant amount of data in Canada 
about the relative poverty of women, by contrast with men, creates an 
urgent need to question the substantive 'neutrality' of legal aid services 
which are provided less frequently in practice to women claimants.36 
Indeed, the disproportionate amount of poverty among women, by 
contrast with men, suggests that gender-neutral categories of 
entitlement may confirm, as Martha Fineman has suggested, that 
'what is is as "biased" as that which challenges it'.37 Such an assertion 
is similarly reflected in Richard Abel's conclusion that serious 
scholarship about legal aid services must take account of its 'inherently 
political nature'.38 Thus, in the context of women's greater relative 
poverty, 'neutral' categories of entitlement to legal aid services must be 
 assessed in terms of their effects in practice (their substantive results), 
not simply on the basis of their use of lfonnal) gender neutral language. 
B. The Public/ Private Dichotomy 
Particularly because of diminishing governmental resources for legal aid 
services in Canada in recent years, there has been a trend in the 
allocation of funds to recognize a priority for legal aid services for 
accused persons charged with criminal offences. Such a priority for 
legal aid services in criminal law matters has been defended on the basis 
of philosophical arguments about the need to ensure adequate 
representation for an individual accused, having regard to the 
seriousness of such matters and the (theoretically) unlimited resources 
of the State in adversarial proceedings. However, these philosophical 
arguments need to be carefully scrutinized, particularly since they 
result in disproportionate funding for legal aid services in criminal 
law matters  (the 'public'), thereby diminishing resources available for 
family law (the 'private'). Thus, the preference for legal aid services in 
criminal law matters may reaffirm the disadvantages for women of the 
public/private dichotomy.39 Historically, the need to provide indigent 
accused with representation in criminal law matters was never the sole 
justification for the introduction of provincial legal aid programmes in  
Canada in the 1960s and 1970s. The report recommending  the creation 
of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan in 1965, for example, expressed the view 
that there was no reason to exclude family law matters from legal aid 
 entitlement: 'In the contemplation of the law of Ontario,  [criminal law 
and family law matters] are equal . . . Any legal aid system which intends 
to ensure the advancement of the protection of the legal rights of the 
needy must surely include matrimonial  causes'.40  Thus, although  the 
factual basis for these assertions is unclear (what information was 
available about the needs of poor women for legal aid services, by 
contrast with the needs of poor men?), governmental policy about legal 
aid services recognized at the outset a commitment to family law 
services for legal aid clients, as well as in relation to those charged 
with criminal offences. Significantly, this early commitment has been 
eroded, not by policy changes per se, but rather by the demands of 
'fiscal federalism' in Canada. Thus, the preference for legal aid 
services in criminal law matters has resulted from the preferential 
federal funding available for criminal law services, a subject within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government.41 In this context, it is arguable 
that the current emphasis on  legal  aid  services  in  criminal law 
matters results more directly from the realities of federal- provincial 
relations to a much greater extent than from philosophical values. 
Moreover, closer scrutiny of the claim that the current priority for 
legal aid services in criminal law matters is fully justified in terms of 
important philosophical values also reveals some difficulties from the 
perspective of gender equality goals. The justification for disproportion- 
ate legal aid resources being allocated to those charged with criminal 
 offences is that an accused person faces a disparity of legal resources 
where the state is the other party in adversarial proceedings, and that 
the possible consequences of the proceedings are severe, including 
imprisonment. These claims are, of course, important; the issue is 
whether their impact is gender neutral. 
In relation to the first claim, that the accused faces a disparity of 
resources, it is important to note that legal aid services accord priority 
to persons accused of criminal offences even though claimants in other 
legal proceedings may also face the disparity of the  State's resources: 
for example, psychiatric patients in commital proceedings, refugee 
claimants in status hearings, and parents in child  protection  proceedings. 
In each of these cases, parties face the disparity of resources of the 
State, and they face similarly severe consequences, including loss of 
liberty in the form of indeterminate commital for psychiatric patients, 
deportation for refugee claimants, and loss of liberty for children 
removed from the care of their parents.  Thus, for these claimants, as for 
accused persons, there are both disparities of resources and serious 
consequences. Yet, the priority for legal aid services accorded to indigent 
accused does not extend to legal aid services in these other situations 
so easily. 
Such an analysis permits us to probe more deeply the neutrality of a 
legal aid system which accords priority to those accused of criminal 
offences, disproportionately men in Canadian society, while 
 simultaneously limiting claims by psychiatric patients, refugees, or 
parents, at least half of whom (or more) may be women. Such a 
conclusion might at least suggest a need to extend legal aid services to 
all those involved 
 
in legal proceedings in which the State is a party (and there is a con- 
sequential disparity of resources) and where the consequences are 
serious for the individual litigant in terms of loss of liberty or 
livelihood. Even more significantly, such an analysis suggests a need 
to examine the underlying values attached to the consequences of 
criminal law and family law matters: what are the unstated values of 
a society which regards the consequences of possible imprisonment for 
an accused charged with a property offence as more significant than 
the loss of custody of one's children in protection proceedings? Is the 
law's traditional division between public and private masking a 
gendered allocation of legal aid funding? 
Moreover,  from  the perspective  of family law disputes,  the law's 
recognition of the need for legal aid services for those accused of criminal 
offences, on the basis of the disparity of legal resources of the accused 
and the State, suggests a need for legal aid programmes to take more 
seriously the disparity of resources of many women, by contrast with 
their male  partners,  in family law disputes.  Why  do legal aid 
programmes readily accept the arguments about the disparity of 
 resources (between an accused person and the State) as the basis for 
defining entitlement for criminal legal aid services, but systematically 
deny the significance of such disparities in the context of legal aid 
services in family law? In thinking about this issue, moreover, it is 
important to consider whether the disparity of resources in the criminal 
justice con- text is as real in practice as in theory especially in a context 
where court congestion, backlogs of cases, and overworked court 
officials (including prosecutors) may not be as formidable in reality as 
the philosophical justification suggests. By contrast, a woman in a 
family law dispute may have to face her affluent husband's well-prepared 
and well-paid private practice lawyer. Such an analysis suggests that 
women in family law cases may have needs which, in practice, are 
just as great in terms of disparate levels of resources as those of men 
accused of criminal offences. Even in the context of the criminal justice 
system, data suggests a lack of equality for men and women in 
terms of access to legal aid services because women may commit 
different crimes, by contrast with men,42  and because they may be 
treated somewhat differently by the criminal  justice system.43 Thus, 
even women accused of criminal offences may not benefit from the 
priority accorded to criminal law matters by legal aid services, at least 
not to the same extent as men. Moreover, in the context of widespread 
male violence in Canadian society, gender inequality is reinforced by 
the priority accorded to legal aid representation for those accused of 
 criminal offences (including assault), rather than for those who are 
the victims of violence. Since most accused persons are men and 
their victims are, most often, women, violence in the 'private' sphere 
results in legal aid representation for those who must answer in the 
'public' sphere, while women's claims for representation (and 
protection) remain 'private'. Such an outcome suggests the law's 
complicity in the public/private dichotomy, a dichotomy which also 
reinforces differential and gendered power relationships in the family. 
C. Equality 
North American jurisprudence about entrenched constitutional 
guarantees of sex equality have been dominated until recently by 
ideas of sameness and difference in relation to men and women. 
According to some American theorists, women's claims to enjoy 
benefits and advantages traditionally enjoyed by men depend on 
assertions that women are similarly situated to men (at least in all 
relevant respects).44 By contrast, others have asserted that equality 
claims must take account of differences between women and men, 
differences such as those associated with reproduction (and perhaps 
some aspects of family roles) which mandate differing needs for 
women, by contrast with men.45 Yet, as has been noted, the problem of 
an approach to equality which focuses on either sameness or difference 
is that they both reinforce men as the standard to which women are 
compared. Thus, whether women are regarded as the same as men, or 
 different from them, the standard of comparison is gendered. 
Especially after the entrenchment of constitutional guarantees of sex 
equality in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Supreme 
Court  jurisprudence in Canada has adopted approaches to equality 
analysis which recognize the limits of 'sameness' equality, and thus 
take account of issues of power differentials and relative disadvantage 
for defined groups in Canadian society. For purposes of this analysis 
of entitlement to legal aid services, the decisions of the Canadian 
Supreme Court are important in two ways.  One is the Court's 
acceptance of a general approach to equality analysis which focuses 
on substantive outcomes for equality analysis and not just formal ideas 
about equality. In decisions of the Court about the systemic nature of 
pregnancy dis- crimination (Brooks v Canada Sofeway Ltd) 46 and in 
relation to sexual harassment of women in employment Uanzen v Plary 
Enterprises Ltd),47 for example, the Court accepted concepts of equality 
and discrimination which recognized gendered societal arrangements and 
the ways in which they created disadvantages for women. Similarly, in 
Action Travail des Femmes v CNR,48 the Court recognized the idea of 
systemic inequality on the basis of sex in a claim which challenged  
the expectations of men and women about 'non-traditional' work; and 
which mandated affirmative action remedies. Moreover, in R v 
Lavallee,49 the Court took into account expressly the differences in a 
woman's experiences of violence in intimate relationships in recognizing 
 the need for expert evidence to establish her sense of 'harm' in relation to 
the traditional view of the defence of self-defence. Cases such as these 
arguably demonstrate that Canadian courts have increasingly taken 
(some) account of the impact of gendered experiences in their equality 
analyses, especially in the interpretation of Charter guarantees. In this 
way, there is Supreme Court of Canada authority for an interpretation 
of equality which goes beyond formal equality guarantees to recognize 
more substantive needs to accomplish gender equality in practice. 
The approach in these decisions is consistent with the Supreme 
Court's decision in Andrews, where the Court eschewed a 'sameness' 
approach for one which recognized the need to take account of the idea 
of relative 'disadvantage' within Canadian society. In such a context, 
the substantive inequality of legal aid services which fail to respond 
to women's needs as well as those of men may be inconsistent with 
constitutionally entrenched equality guarantees. In this way, the Court's 
language about equality as disadvantage may also arguably confine both 
federal and provincial legislative choices about entitlement to legal aid 
services in Canada, particularly where they fail to accord substantive 
equality on the basis of gender. In the context of Andrews, legal aid 
services must take account of substantive disadvantages for women, not 
merely whether women are similarly situated in relation to men with 
respect to gender neutral services. 
Thus, both the Andrews decision and others relating to sex equality 
 guarantees mandate legal aid services for men and women without dis- 
crimination. In this way, legal aid programmes must be assessed, not 
in terms of the gender-neutral language they use to describe entitlement 
to legal aid services, but in relation to the substantive outcome of the 
application of their criteria. Thus, the gender equality objectives of legal 
aid programmes must be tested in terms of outcomes and results, not 
just aspirations. 
 
4. R E-V ISI O N I N G  A C C ESS  T O J USTICE  FO R  W O M E N 
Effective strategies for gender equality require a re-assessment of ends as well 
as means. The paradigmatic liberal prescription equal opportunity is a 
necessary but never sufficient social objective. The ultimate goal is not simply 
to ensure women's full participation in organizations that wield social, 
economic, and political power; it is rather to change the nature of those 
organizations and the way power is distributed and exercised. Our priority 
should be to empower women as well as men to reshape the institutions that 
are shaping them. At issue is not simply equality between the sexes, but the 
quality of life for both of them.50 
Rhode's assertion captures the difference between an analysis of 
gender equality in our current legal aid arrangements and visions of 
access to justice which promote substantive equality for men and women 
in the legal process. In her view, for example, such re-assessment means 
that concerns  about  individual  intent  in  legal  analysis  should  be 
 replaced by a focus on institutional practices in relation to 
discrimination; thus, she has suggested that 'the law's approach to 
rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence must reach beyond the 
relatively rare circumstances in which an individual plaintiff comes 
forward with conclusive proof of injury' to one which focuses 'more 
critically on the cultural conditions that foster sexual abuse and on the 
law-enforcement practices that discourage redress'.51 Such restructuring 
might need to take seriously the identification of what legal aid services 
are appropriate for the victims of family violence (more often women 
and children) and how services should be organized to be most 
effective in meeting their needs. Thus, focusing our attention on legal 
aid services as an institutional resource for achieving equality, we may 
need to rethink the provision of legal aid services in family law 
matters, the need for student legal aid clinics which offer services to 
battered women but not to male batterers, and the appropriateness of a 
legal aid clinic providing services to women in family law matters. In 
each case, the real question is the extent to which such services 
contribute to institutional objectives of substantive equality. Or, as 
Rhode suggested, 'by broadening our aspirations to justice, we may 
come closer to attaining it'.52 
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